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ABSTRACT
The aim of the study was to analyze the influence of the dimensions of national culture on the relationship between corporate 
governance (CG) and earnings management (EM). There is evidence that in certain cultural contexts CG mechanisms 
appear to be ineffective in minimizing EM. Studies on governance and its influence on accounting information quality 
can help market participants make better decisions. It is important to include the cultural context in this relationship as it 
sheds light on an aspect that has hardly been explored in the research, which can improve the informational environment of 
organizations. In practical terms, the results may contribute to organizations paying more attention to the cultural influence 
of countries when implementing or improving their governance mechanisms, with the aim of making them more effective in 
aligning interests and monitoring behaviors in organizations. Moreover, market participants may require alterations in these 
mechanisms in more individualistic and indulgent cultural contexts. The sample was composed of 18,707 observations of 
companies located in 24 countries belonging to the G20 group, covering 2010 to 2017. The data were operationalized using a 
multiple linear regression, with robust standard errors and controls for sector and year fixed effects, using the propensity score 
matching (PSM) method. The premise that CG can minimize EM was confirmed in this research, except in individualistic 
and indulgent countries. In these cultural contexts, governance mechanisms tend to be ineffective in minimizing EM. 
These results contribute to the literature by highlighting that the culture of countries can impact the effectiveness of CG in 
mitigating opportunistic practices, which explains the ambiguous results of previous research.
Keywords: earnings management, corporate governance, national culture.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The problems organizations face arising from the 
separation between ownership and control have been 
known through the literature since the study of Berle and 
Means (1932). For Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers’ 
interests may clash with those of equity holders and, 
as a result, the former tend to act in favor of their own 
individual goals, neglecting shareholders’ objectives. 
Managers’ individual incentives to act in their own 
interest can vary, such as the need to achieve a particular 
goal related to results or market expectations (Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999). As a result of such incentives, managers 
may adopt earnings management (EM) strategies. Despite 
these strategies not violating accounting standards or 
norms, they can lead to less reliable and poorer quality 
accounting statements, considering that stakeholders 
place their trust in the numbers reported and make their 
decisions based on them (Rahman & Ali, 2006).
Given the agency problems that can encourage 
EM practices, Rahman and Ali (2006) state that it is 
extremely important for organizations to include control 
mechanisms to safeguard shareholders’ interests and 
guarantee transparent and quality information for the 
interested parties. These mechanisms are known as 
corporate governance (CG) practices and are included in 
organizations with the aim of controlling agency problems 
and thus mitigating EM practices (Peasnell et al., 2005).
Previous studies have investigated the relationship 
between CG and EM in companies in different countries 
and have indicated that in some cases CG is unable to 
mitigate EM practices. For example, Rahman and Ali 
(2006) found that the board of directors was ineffective in 
minimizing EM practices in companies listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia Berhad and, contrary to what was predicted, they 
identified that CG encouraged greater EM. More recently, 
Matteo and Francesco (2018) revealed that the internal 
participation of shareholders was unable to minimize 
EM in Brazil, while Waweru and Prot (2018) identified 
CG mechanisms that influenced EM practices differently 
in East Africa, finding divergences among their results.
Other authors have sought explanations for the 
results that have highlighted the ineffectiveness of 
CG in mitigating EM, noting that these results may 
be conditioned by external factors, such as aspects of 
the institutional, legal, or cultural environment (Bao & 
Lewellyn, 2017; Filatotchev et al., 2013). This research 
focuses on the latter, by considering that the composition 
and structure of CG systems reflect the predominant 
cultural influences in the society in which organizations 
operate (Daniel et al., 2012; Humphries & Whelan, 
2017; Li & Harrison, 2008). The empirical evidence of 
Bao and Lewellyn (2017), for example, show that the 
relationship between the ownership structure and EM 
was significantly moderated by institutional elements 
at the country level. 
Considering that the empirical results of studies 
suggest that national culture may have relevant effects 
on CG [see, for example, Li and Harrison (2008), Daniel 
et al. (2012), and Humphries and Whelan (2017)], it is 
understood that this aspect should be taken into account 
in transnational studies (Li & Harrison, 2008). Therefore, 
it is assumed that the norms that form part of the culture 
of a society affect the structure of its organizations (Li & 
Harrison, 2008). Thus, based on the recommendations 
of Bao and Lewellyn (2017), a gap is identified in terms 
of research that seeks to investigate the role of national 
culture in the relationship between CG and EM.
This study is therefore based on the assumption 
that cultural characteristics can enhance or weaken 
the effectiveness of CG mechanisms in mitigating EM. 
Considering that the cultural norms of a society affect 
the organizational structure (Li & Harrison, 2008), 
investigating the relationship between CG and EM in 
different cultural contexts can broaden the understanding 
of the results revealed by the literature. In light of this, the 
following research question arises: what is the influence 
of the dimensions of national culture on the relationship 
between CG and EM?
This research is warranted by the finding of Bao 
and Lewellyn (2017) that most studies on EM concern 
companies located in a single country. This reveals the little 
attention given to the impact of the national environment 
and thus warrants the present study, which considers 
companies from 24 countries exposed to different cultural 
characteristics and therefore enables comprehensive 
results.  
The contributions provide evidence that CG 
mechanisms at a company level can influence EM practices 
differently when immersed in culturally different contexts. 
This makes it possible to understand why in some contexts 
CG does not appear to show the same effectiveness in 
minimizing EM. Moreover, a theoretical contribution 
is derived from identifying that managers’ behavior – 
understood as behavior focusing on their own interests, 
but minimized by control mechanisms, such as CG 
controls – can be influenced by the cultural values of 
the country they belong to. 
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It is also noted that the studies have investigated 
the impact of CG on EM by considering governance 
mechanisms in isolation (such as characteristics of 
the audit committee or of the board of directors). In 
contrast, this study uses aggregate measures that reveal 
the effectiveness of mechanisms related to management, 
to protecting shareholders, and to integration strategies. 
It is important to analyze CG using different mechanisms 
as, according to Bao and Lewellyn (2017), the main 
agency conflict in emerging countries occurs between 
majority and minority shareholders and, in this context, 
the management mechanisms would be unable to mitigate 
EM practices, thus requiring control mechanisms for 
shareholder behavior.
2. ANTECEDENTS AND THEORETICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
EM practices are usually divided in the literature into 
accruals-based and real EM. Accruals-based EM is also 
called accounting-based EM by the researchers and refers 
to situations allowed by accounting rules, but with a 
specific purpose, with the aim of increasing or reducing 
earnings in the period. Fields et al. (2001) indicate, as 
examples, the decision to choose the stock evaluation 
method, choosing to structure a lease contract so that it 
qualifies for operational lease treatment [although with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 16, 
as of 2019 this no longer applies], choices that affect the 
level of disclosure, and even choices at the moment of 
adopting the accounting standards. 
Real EM is known as operations-based EM. This 
is related to the type of EM in which, with the aim of 
achieving a specific objective, managers decide to modify 
certain levels of company operating activities, normally 
measured using accounting records. For Gunny (2010), 
real EM occurs when managers carry out actions that 
alter the structure of an operation, investment, and/or 
financing, in order to influence the production of the 
accounting system. For example, this can include increased 
sales through liquidation, increased production to dilute 
fixed costs, and reduced research and development (R&D) 
spending, among others. 
The review of previous research reveals that CG 
mechanisms are known to be means that can mitigate 
conflicts of interest and opportunistic manager behavior; 
that is, CG acts as a restrictive factor for EM practices 
(Bajra & Cadez, 2018; Hutchinson et al., 2008; Leuz et al., 
2003). In some contexts, however, results were identified 
that revealed the ineffectiveness of CG mechanisms for 
this purpose (Ali Shah et al., 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2008).
In order to understand the divergence among 
the previous findings, Bao and Lewellyn (2017) 
investigated country-level factors that can impact the 
relationship between CG and EM. The authors found 
that the relationship between ownership structure and 
EM is influenced by institutional elements, and they 
recommended that future investigations analyze the 
influence of other country-level factors on the relationship 
between the topics, such as legal and cultural aspects. 
The premise that the culture of countries may be a 
factor that influences both CG and EM organizational 
practices is based on Gray’s (1988) cultural influence 
approach. The author developed a theoretical lens that 
perceives organizations as accounting systems that are 
influenced by cultural values and tendencies derived from 
the country in which they operate. Gray’s (1988) research 
was based on the national culture model proposed by 
Hofstede (1980). The most up-to-date model from 
Hofstede et al. (2010) considers six cultural dimensions: 
power distance, individualism versus collectivism; 
masculinity versus femininity; uncertainty avoidance; 
long-term orientation versus short-term orientation; and 
indulgence versus restraint.
Besides investigating national culture, studies such as 
that of Haga et al. (2019) have sought to identify whether 
companies in cultural contexts geared toward the long 
or short term tend to manage earnings more through 
real activities or through accruals. They have discovered 
that companies in cultures with a long-term orientation 
depend more on accruals-based EM, while those in 
cultures with a short-term orientation engage more in 
real EM. These results show the importance of studying 
these relationships.
3. EMPIRICAL REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The assumptions that CG reduces EM practices and 
that, conversely, the country’s culture is a determining 
factor for the increased and/or reduced effectiveness 
of control mechanisms, both provide the basis for the 
hypotheses of this research. Explanations are therefore 
given below for assuming that the six dimensions of 
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national culture from Hofstede’s model play a moderating 
role in the relationship between CG and EM.
According to Hofstede (2011), the cultural dimension 
of power distance portrays the measure of how much 
individuals accept and expect power to be distributed in 
organizations, institutions, and society. In societies with 
a high power distance, individuals accept inequality, they 
have the need for hierarchies, and they believe that people 
who have more power should also have more privileges. 
For Ugrin et al. (2017), societies exposed to a high 
power distance have greater autonomy and are questioned 
less about their practices and, for that reason, managers 
tend to show opportunistic behavior, which implies greater 
EM. Other studies also support this premise, such as those 
of Doupnik (2008) and Gray et al. (2015). It is therefore 
assumed that in societies with a high power distance, CG 
mechanisms tend to be less effective, as managers have 
greater autonomy over their decisions and tend to behavior 
opportunistically, managing earnings more intensively. 
Within this context, the first hypothesis of this study is 
formulated as follows:
H1: the capacity of CG to mitigate EM practices is reduced in 
countries whose national culture is based on a high power distance.
Individualism versus collectivism measures the 
degree to which individuals take care of themselves 
or remain part of groups. Individualistic cultures are 
more self-aware and value individual contributions, 
while collectivist cultures value the contributions of the 
group (Hofstede, 2018).
The studies of Han et al. (2010) and Ugrin et al. (2017) 
highlighted the positive relationship between individualism 
and EM, which is based on the understanding that this 
cultural tendency is associated with greater flexibility 
and managers’ willingness to report more optimistic 
numbers. Therefore, as it is understood that individualism 
encourages opportunistic manager behavior, it is perceived 
that CG mechanisms will be less effective in minimizing 
EM, since in these societies managers are more likely 
to manipulate earnings. This gives rise to the second 
research hypothesis:
H2: the capacity of CG to mitigate EM practices is reduced in 
countries whose national culture is based on individualism.
For Hofstede (2011), the masculinity cultural 
dimension refers to societies that prioritize performance 
and success and are characterized as being more objective 
when compared with feminine values, which prioritize a 
higher quality of life and personal relationships. Moreover, 
Li and Harrison (2008) state that competitiveness, 
assertiveness, and material ambition are tendencies of 
a masculine society.
According to Paredes and Wheatley (2017), managers 
in masculine societies tend to be less concerned about 
external interests and prioritize individuals, making them 
more likely to engage in EM. Due to managers focusing 
on private objectives and not on those of the organization, 
CG is expected to be less effective in its role of minimizing 
agency problems, as these problems are more present in 
highly masculine societies. Within this context, the third 
hypothesis of this study is formulated:
H3: the capacity of CG to mitigate EM practices is reduced in 
countries whose national culture is based on masculinity.
Societies with high uncertainty avoidance are associated 
with more rigid rules and control, using these with the 
aim of preventing and avoiding uncertain situations (Han 
et al., 2010). As a result, according to Han et al. (2010), 
company managers in this cultural context would engage 
less in EM, because the greater control and rigid rules 
would mitigate opportunistic EM practices.
The negative relationship between the cultural context 
of uncertainty avoidance and EM is also supported 
by Paredes and Whealtey (2017), who identified that 
countries with high uncertainty avoidance prefer to be 
more conservative and seek to avoid the risk associated 
with EM practices. Based on this, in societies that avoid 
uncertainty the capacity of CG mechanisms to mitigate 
EM is expected to be strengthened, as these societies 
adhere to more rigid controls. Therefore, the fourth 
hypothesis of this research is formulated:
H4: the capacity of CG to mitigate EM practices is strengthened in 
countries whose national culture is based on uncertainty avoidance.
Long-term orientation versus a short-term orientation 
is related to the expected time of return in terms of 
compensation or results from a task or implemented 
action. Societies with a long-term orientation tend to 
be more concerned about perpetuating into the future 
and, for this reason, they strive for continuous results 
(Hofstede, 1991).
According to Ugrin et al. (2017), societies with a 
short-term orientation may be inclined to manage 
earnings in order to stabilize or increase current profits, 
without considering the negative future effects, such 
as the reduction in earnings quality; these cultures are 
motivated by the positive immediate effects resulting from 
EM. However, in cultures with a long-term orientation, 
companies are more cautious in their decisions and tend 
to manage a smaller proportion of earnings.
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It is believed that the capacity of CG mechanisms to 
mitigate EM practices is strengthened in societies with a 
long-term orientation, given that this cultural tendency 
values greater control and transparent information, with 
a view to perpetuating organizations in the long run. 
Therefore, the fifth hypothesis of this study is formulated:
H5: the capacity of CG to mitigate EM practices is strengthened in 
countries whose national culture is based on a long-term orientation.
The indulgence versus restraint cultural dimension 
is defined as the measure of how much societies control 
their desires. In indulgent societies, the controls are 
considered to be relatively weak, unlike in restrained 
societies, which require more rules and laws that make 
the controls relatively strong (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
According to Ugrin et al. (2017), companies in societies 
with an indulgent culture are more likely to engage in 
opportunistic EM practices, as there is more freedom to 
act in favor of their own interests. In contrast, companies 
in societies exposed to a restrained culture tend to manage 
earnings less intensely, as they are exposed to a context 
in which laws and restrictions are more common, which 
naturally mitigates this practice.
Based on the above, the capacity of CG mechanisms 
to minimize EM is assumed to be reduced in countries 
with a cultural tendency for indulgence, as these societies 
are less likely to include laws and restrictions in their 
processes. Within this context, the sixth hypothesis of 
this study is formulated:
H6: the capacity of CG to mitigate EM practices is reduced in 
countries whose national culture is based on indulgence.
The authors of this research did not find any studies 
that addressed the moderating role of national culture 
in the relationship between CG and EM and so the 
six research hypotheses were formulated based on the 
concepts of the dimensions of Hofstede’s (2018) national 
culture model and on the relationship that has already 
been supported in the literature between national culture 
and opportunistic EM practices. Therefore, in line with 
the theoretical support presented, the theoretical analysis 
model is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 Theoretical analysis model
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
4. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
The research population was composed of companies 
from countries that comprise the G20 group and have 
national culture scores, based on Hofstede’s (2018) model. 
The data were collected from the Refinitiv Eikon database. 
Companies located in countries belonging to the G20 
were chosen due to their economic representativeness 
and because the almost 40 countries in this group are 
dissimilar in cultural terms, which is important when 
analyzing national culture.
To delineate the sample, companies were excluded that 
lacked the information needed to calculate the variables, 
as well as companies from the financial sector (as they 
have particular characteristics such as different leverage 
levels, which can bias the results of the estimation models). 
Moreover, companies that lacked information on EM 
practices were excluded (this was the criterion that led to 
the greatest exclusion of companies). The sample totaled 
18,707 observations of companies located in 24 countries, 
covering 2010 to 2017, as presented in Table 1.
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Table 1 
Population and delineation of the research sample
Panel A – Delineation of the sample by year and country
Countries 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total %
Argentina - - - - - - 4 26 30 0.16
Australia 141 160 181 212 232 239 257 263 1,685 9.01
Belgium 16 17 17 18 18 19 20 21 146 0.78
Brazil 26 56 62 64 70 72 73 73 496 2.65
Canada 150 165 174 180 197 210 221 227 1,524 8.15
China 55 105 114 114 121 131 142 147 929 4.97
Denmark 18 18 18 18 19 20 21 21 153 0.82
Finland 23 23 23 24 24 24 24 24 189 1.01
France 73 74 75 76 76 77 81 82 614 3.28
Greece 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 85 0.45
Germany 61 69 71 73 77 79 83 85 598 3.20
India 38 58 61 65 73 79 82 82 538 2.88
Indonesia 11 19 20 21 26 29 31 31 188 1.00
Ireland 23 23 24 27 30 32 32 32 223 1.19
Italy 25 26 26 26 26 27 28 28 212 1.13
Japan 340 346 350 356 363 368 375 377 2,875 15.37
Mexico 13 18 19 22 25 29 29 34 189 1.01
Netherlands 28 29 30 32 34 36 39 41 269 1.44
Poland 10 14 15 15 18 19 19 19 129 0.69
Russia 26 28 30 31 31 32 33 33 244 1.30
South Korea 33 72 79 82 84 88 96 97 631 3.37
Spain 29 30 32 33 36 36 37 37 270 1.44
Turkey 9 16 16 17 18 19 19 19 133 0.71
USA 546 569 580 590 605 772 1,229 1,466 6,357 33.98
Total 1,704 1,945 2,027 2,107 2,214 2,448 2,986 3,276 18,707 100.00
Panel B – Delineation of the sample by year and sector
Sectors 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total %
1 305 347 361 375 400 440 548 600 3376 18.05
2 126 142 154 158 166 185 219 226 1376 7.36
3 170 194 208 212 222 240 262 280 1788 9.56
4 127 139 143 156 168 199 287 340 1559 8.33
5 346 409 419 431 447 503 615 683 3853 20.60
6 194 211 214 228 239 281 391 449 2207 11.80
7 258 295 311 321 333 350 388 403 2659 14.21
8 51 64 69 73 82 84 91 93 607 3.24
9 47 52 52 56 58 60 69 75 469 2.51
10 80 92 96 97 99 106 116 127 813 4.35
Total 1,704 1,945 2,027 2,107 2,214 2,448 2,986 3,276 18,707 100.00
Note: The sectors were classified using the Global Industry Classification Standard Code (1 = discretionary consumption; 
2 = consumer goods; 3 = energy; 4 = health; 5 = industrial; 6 = information technology; 7 = basic materials; 8 = real estate; 
9 = telecommunications; 10 = utilities). 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The analysis in Panel A of Table 1 shows that the 
most representative countries are the United States 
and Japan, which together represent approximately 
50% of the sample. Panel B, in turn, shows that the 
most representative sectors are industrial (20.60%) and 
consumer goods (18.05%). Table 1 shows the general 
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evolution in the number of companies that started 
to adopt CG practices, as the number of companies 
increased by around 52% from 2010 to 2017 (1,704 in 
2010 to 3,216 in 2017). Finally, it is worth noting that 
this period was chosen to carry out the research because 
the database only includes representative information 
about CG after 2010. 
Table 2 shows the research variables.
Table 2 
Research variables 




Discretionary accruals operationalized in 
absolute values.




Measures the systems and processes of a 
company, ensuring that its members and 
executives act in the best interest of its 
shareholders in the long run. 
Own methodology of Refinitiv Eikon, 
which includes mechanisms focusing on 
management, shareholders, and strategies. 




Measures whether the least powerful 
members of an institution expect and 
accept the hierarchy (power) to be 
distribution unequally. 
Score proposed by Hofstede, which varies 




Measures the degree of interdependence 




Measures the division of roles between 
men and women in the society.
Uncertainty avoidance 
 (UA_CULT)
Measures how much the members of 
a culture feel threatened by uncertain 




Measures whether people prefer to 
maintain honored traditions and norms 
(STO) or favor pragmatic virtues orientated 




Measures how much people try to control 
their desires and impulses. In the case 
of indulgence, control in the country 
is relatively weak, while in the case of 
restraint it is considered to be relatively 
strong.
Hofstede et al. (2010), 
Hofstede (2018)
Independent control variables
Size (SIZit) Natural logarithm (NL) of total revenue NL of total revenue Haga et al. (2018)
Return on assets (ROA) Return on assets
Net income in t-1 divided by total assets 
in t-1 Lin et al. (2016)
Leverage (LEV)
Share of third-party resources in the 
company’s capital structure
Total liabilities divided by total net equity Beuren & Klann (2015)
Sales growth (SG)
Sales growth calculated by the change in 
revenues




Production costs and discretionary 
spending model




Identifies the year in which the countries 
obligatorily adopted IFRS
Categorical variable in which 1 represents 
the year in which the country adopted 
IFRS, and 0 otherwise
Isidro et al. (2020)
Sector (sectori)
Main activity classified using the Global 
Industry Classification Standard Code
Sector dummies Haga et al. (2018)
Year Analysis period: from 2010 to 2017 Year dummies Haga et al. (2018)
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
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CG was calculated using the Kothari et al. (2005) 
model, which included return on assets (ROA) as an 
explanatory variable for total accruals, based on the 
assumption that total accruals could be influenced by the 
company’s profitability, but not through manipulation. The 
Kothari et al. (2005) model is an extension of the modified 
Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). The econometric 
model for estimating accruals used in this research can 
be observed in equation 1. 
 




in which TAit are the total accruals obtained by the change 
in working capital and scaled by At-1, Ait-1 are the total 
assets of company i in period t-1, ∆Vit is the change in 
sales scaled by At-1, ∆RECit is the change in receivables 
scaled by At-1, PPEit are the gross fixed assets scaled by 
At-1, ROAit is the return on assets scaled by At-1, εit is the 
regression error, and δ0, δ1, δ2, δ3, and δ4 are the estimated 
coefficients of the regression.
Total accruals were calculated based on the change in 
working capital corresponding to the sum of the change 
in receivables, the change in stocks, and the change in 
other assets minus the change in accounts payable and 
tax payable, as proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002). 
The Kothari et al. (2005) model was operationalized cross-
sectionally by country, sector, and year.
The variable relating to CG was collected from the 
Refinitiv Eikon database, which considers the CG pillar 
to be the quantity of mechanisms that each organization 
has, which can focus on management, shareholders, 
and strategies for integrating economic, social, and 
environmental practices. These three types of mechanisms 
are considered dimensions of CG. The first (management) 
reflects the commitment and effectiveness of organizations 
in following what the database determines as best CG 
practices, the second (shareholders) reflects their 
effectiveness in treating minority and majority shareholders 
equally, and the third (integration of economic, social, and 
environmental practices) identifies the use of practices 
geared toward integrating these topics into strategies and 
day-to-day company decision-making processes.
Using its own methodology, the database provides a 
general score for the CG mechanisms that are related to 
the three aforementioned dimensions. The database uses 
criteria to obtain this final score; that is, if the company 
has or does not have a particular practice related to the CG 
dimensions. The score ultimately shows, in quantitative 
terms from 0 to 100, the quantity of CG practices that 
each company has.
The mechanisms related to management evaluate, for 
example, whether the company has or does not have a 
policy on functions of the board and audit committee or 
a policy for board and audit committee independence, 
among others. The mechanisms related to shareholders 
evaluate the effectiveness of the companies in treating their 
shareholders equally and in using anti-takeover devices 
through policies for equal voting rights or shareholder 
engagement, among others. Finally, the mechanisms used 
to communicate and integrate the economic (financial), 
social, and environmental dimensions into their decision-
making processes cover the sustainability committee, 
engagement of interested parties, the sustainability report, 
and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines, 
among others.
According to the information provided by the database 
in 2018, the CG pillar considers more than 100 items, in 
which 55 involve the management dimension, 35 involve 
the shareholders dimension, and 11 involve integration 
strategies. The weight of each dimension derives from 
the magnitude of weights of each group of sectors and 
ultimately shows the quantity of CG practices that each 
company uses.
Considering the number of mechanisms of each 
company, the database generates a final score, which 
was used in this research as a general measure of CG. 
The methodology used to evaluate the CG pillar of 
each company can be verified in detail in the Refinitiv 
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) report.
The national culture model used in this research was 
developed by Gert Hofstede (2018) and is composed of six 
cultural dimensions: (i) power distance; (ii) individualism 
versus collectivism; (iii) masculinity versus femininity; 
(iv) uncertainty avoidance; (v) long-term orientation 
versus short-term orientation; and (vi) indulgence versus 
restraint. Each one of these is measured on a scale from 0 
to 100. The closer to 100, the greater the power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-
term orientation, and indulgence in the society.
The variables shown in Table 2 were operationalized 
using a multiple linear regression (ordinary least squares 
– OLS), with robust standard errors and sector and year 
fixed effects. The general equation from which the models 
were derived is the following:
0 1    *it n j n j it n it itEM CG CULT CULT CG SGβ δ δ ε=∝ + + ∑ + ∑ +∅ ∑ +
1
2
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With relation to the assumptions of the regression, it 
should be highlighted that using robust standard errors 
minimized heteroscedasticity problems, multicollinearity 
was tested using the variance inflation factor (VIF) test, 
autocorrelation of the residuals was tested using the 
Durbin Watson test, and, finally, the normality was relaxed 
due to the number of observations obtained.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE MAIN RESULTS
This section presents the analysis and discussion 
of the results. It should be noted that the hypotheses 
of this research were based on the assumption of a 
negative relationship between CG and EM, which has 
been confirmed empirically, but is not presented due to 
the limited space. Therefore, this section focuses on the 
influence of the dimensions of national culture on the 
relationship between the topics.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the research 
variables. It should be noted that the discretionary accruals 
(EMit) variable was operationalized in absolute values and 
real activities-based earnings management (REMit) was 
operationalized in nominal values. Real activities-based 
earnings management (REMit) was calculated based on 
the aggregate measure proposed by Cohen and Zarowin 
(2008). Moreover, it should be noted that the ROA, LEV, and 
SG variables are presented in their values winsorized from 
1 to 99% and that the CG and national culture variables 
had their scales transformed from 0 to 100 to 0 to 10 so 
that they were similar to the scale of the other variables. 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics
Panel A – Descriptive statistics of the company-level variables
EMit CGit SIZit ROAit-1 LEVit SGit REMit
Mean 0.06 0.50 21.78 0.03 1.77 0.11 0.02
StDev 0.09 0.21 1.85 0.14 3.07 0.72 0.37
Minimum 0.00 0.02 5.63 -3.36 -10.70 -0.87 -1.77
25 Perc 0.01 0.33 20.88 0.01 0.65 -0.04 -0.12
Median 0.03 0.50 21.88 0.04 1.21 0.04 0.02
75 Perc 0.06 0.67 22.95 0.07 2.18 0.14 0.18
Maximum 0.96 0.99 26.93 0.30 20.42 11.25 1.94
Obs. 18,707
Panel B – Descriptive statistics of the national culture variables
PDj INDIj MASj UAj LTOj INDUj
Mean 56 54 52 68 52 50
StDev 19 22 18 24 24 19
25 Perc 38 37 42 48 35 34
Median 58 55 55 75 47 49
75 Perc 68 74 65 86 74 66
24 countries
UA = uncertainty avoidance; LEVit = leverage; REMit = real activities-based earnings management; SGit = sales growth; StDev = 
standard deviation; PD = power distance; EMit = Kothari et al. (2005) EM model; INDI = individualism; INDU = indulgence; 
MASC = masculinity; Obs. = observations; LTO = long-term orientation; Perc. = percentile; GDPt = gross domestic product; 
ROAit-1 = return on assets; CSRit = corporate social responsibility; SIZit = size. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The CGit measure reveals that the companies have 
around 50% of the mechanisms analyzed by the database 
and that, in the sample, there are both companies with 
few CG practices (which can be verified by the minimum 
value of the variable) and companies with approximately 
100% of the CG practices (which can be verified by the 
maximum value of the variable). Moreover, the absolute 
discretionary accruals proxy shows that the companies in 
the sample manipulated their accounting values during 
the investigation period.
With relation to the other variables, it is observed that 
the companies present a positive ROA and that for every 
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R$ 1.00 in own capital there is R$ 1.77 in third-party 
capital. However, when analyzing the median for leverage, 
it is perceived that half of the companies finance their 
investments mostly with own capital. Finally, revenues 
showed growth from one year to the next, on average, 
and a high standard deviation, which may be due to 
companies with high values (maximum value of 11.25). 
Among the dimensions of national culture of the 
countries in the sample, it is worth mentioning the high 
mean and median of uncertainty avoidance, which means 
that most of the countries are likely to avoid situations 
that involve uncertainty.
Tables 4, 5, and 6 present the results regarding the 
influence of the cultural dimensions on the relationship 
between CG and EM. It should be noted that the CG and 
cultural variables were standardized in Z-scores before 
being multiplied, as suggested by Dawson (2014) for 
when non-binary variables are concerned. Table 4 shows 
the results of the influence of the national culture on the 
relationship between CG and EM for the whole sample.
Table 4 
Results of the influence of the dimensions of national culture on the relationship between earnings management (EM) and 
corporate governance (CG) 
EMit EMit EMit EMit EMit EMit
β β β β β β
Constant (7.82) (2.51) (4.58) (10.01) (7.79) (1.60)
CGit
-0.0160** -0.0210*** -0.0154** -0.0230*** -0.0277*** -0.0215***






































-0.0203** -0.0066 -0.0218** 0.0081 0.0294*** -0.0000
(-2.30) (-0.74) (-2.50) (0.93) (3.23) (-0.00)
ROAit-1
0.0078 0.0076 0.0106 -0.0054 -0.0036 0.0068
(0.57) (0.55) (0.78) (-0.40) (-0.27) (0.51)
LEVit
0.0125 0.0128 0.0132 0.0068 0.0099 0.0133
(1.21) (1.25) (1.28) (0.67) (0.98) (1.29)
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EMit EMit EMit EMit EMit EMit
β β β β β β
SGit
0.0266*** 0.0249*** 0.0259*** 0.0214** 0.0224** 0.0255***
(3.06) (2.87) (2.99) (2.51) (2.59) (2.95)
REMit
-0.1196*** -0.1231*** -0.1215*** -0.1148*** -0.1212*** -0.1225***
(-13.15) (-13.61) (-13.36) (-12.83) (-13.50) (-13.52)
IFRSj
0.1222*** 0.0366*** 0.1678*** 0.0803*** -0.0205*** 0.0552***
(20.78) (6.27) (17.33) (13.58) (-3.26) (9.46)
Sig. 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
R² 7.21% 8.47% 7.32% 10.46% 10.06% 8.10%
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Max VIF 1.49 1.82 1.70 1.41 2.04 1.84
DW 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99
Observations 18,707 18,707 18,707 18,707 18,707 18,707
UAj = uncertainty avoidance score of each country; LEVit = leverage; REMit = real activities-based earnings management; SGit 
= sales growth; PDj = power distance score of each country; DW = Durbin Watson; FE = fixed effect; CGit = CG score of each 
company; CGit*UAj = multiplication of the standardized values of CG and UA; CGit*PDj = multiplication of the standardized 
values of CG and PD; CGit*INDIj = multiplication of the standardized values of CG and INDI; CGit*INDUj = multiplication of 
the standardized values of CG and INDU; CGit*MASj = multiplication of the standardized values of CG and MAS; CGit*LTOj 
= multiplication of the standardized values of CG and LTO; EMit = discretionary accruals in absolute values estimated by the 
Kothari et al. (2005) model; IFRS = International Accounting Standards; INDIj = individualism score of each country; INDUj = 
indulgence score of each country; MASj = masculinity score of each country; LTOj = long-term orientation score of each country; 
ROAit-1 = return on assets; Sig. = model significance; SIZit = log of total assets; Max VIF = highest variance inflation factor (VIF) 
value; β = standardized coefficient. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors and sector and year fixed effect controls. t statistic in 
parentheses. 
***, **, * = significance at 1, 5, 10%, respectively. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
In this analysis, it is perceived that the significant 
results of the moderating variables are statistically 
sensitive, as they present a 10% probability that this 
relationship is not the case. Nonetheless, these results 
show the negative relationship between the CG and 
power distance interaction (CGit*PDj) and EMit 
practices and the positive relationship between the CG 
and individualism interaction (CGit*INDIj) and EMit. 
The sum of the coefficients of the interaction with the 
CGit variable confirms the negative relationship for 
power distance (-0.0160 : -0.0116), but not the positive 
relationship for individualism (-0.0210 : 0.0122), which 
presents a negative sum. 
The moderation of power distance differs from the 
theoretical assumption of this study, which is based on 
the premise that the cultural dimension of power distance, 
as discussed by Hofstede (2018), induces individuals to 
accept the unequal distribution of power in society and 
to believe that people with greater power should also have 
more privileges. For this reason, managers were expected 
to have greater autonomy and to be less questioned about 
their practices, which, theoretically, would hinder the 
effectiveness of CG practices in reducing opportunistic 
practices such as EM. The moderation of individualism, in 
turn, is consistent with what was expected when analyzing 
the interaction coefficient, but not when analyzing the 
CG and interaction coefficients together, which reveal a 
negative sign between the topics.
Considering the statistical sensitivity of these 
results, the second analysis was carried out, in which 
the companies located in the most populous countries 
in the sample were excluded. As shown in Table 1, the 
United States and Japan together represent almost 50% 
of the sample, which may generate biased results, as the 
other cultural configurations are not emphasized given the 
considerable number of companies in these countries. For 
this reason, Table 5 presents the results of the influence 
of the dimensions of national culture on the relationship 
between CG and EM practices for 9,475 observations of 
companies belonging to the other countries. 
Table 4 
Cont.
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Table 5 
Results of the influence of the dimensions of national culture on the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and 
earnings management (EM) without companies located in the United States and Japan
EMit EMit EMit EMit EMit EMit
β β β β β β
Constant (12.43) (12.74) (10.45) (12.60) (11.89) (9.52)
CGit
-0.0035 0.0013 -0.0155 -0.0130 -0.0118 -0.0090






































-0.1138*** -0.1187*** -0.1016*** -0.0956*** -0.0874*** -0.0919***
(-7.68) (-7.87) (-6.77) (-6.30) (-5.51) (-5.76)
ROAit-1
-0.0221 -0.0227 -0.0203 -0.0224 -0.0253 -0.0242
(-0.78) (-0.80) (-0.71) (-0.78) (-0.88) (-0.85)
LEVit
0.0130 0.0127 0.0128 0.01378 0.0132 0.0136
(0.82) (0.80) (0.81) (0.87) (0.84) (0.86)
SGit
0.0478*** 0.0489*** 0.0448*** 0.0455*** 0.0468*** 0.0473***
(3.02) (3.08) (2.84) (2.88) (2.96) (2.98)
REMit
-0.0642*** -0.0637*** -0.0683*** -0.0644*** -0.0663*** -0.0667***
(-4.90) (-4.84) (-5.21) (-4.93) (-5.05) (-5.08)
IFRSj
-0.1208*** -0.1147*** -0.1175*** -0.1000*** -0.1428*** -0.1574***
(-10.52) (-10.50) (-10.20) (-7.48) (-13.06) (-12.69)
Sig. 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
R² 5.53% 5.58% 5.62% 5.68% 5.68% 5.71%
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Max VIF 1.64 1.70 1.70 1.51 1.71 1.75
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EMit EMit EMit EMit EMit EMit
β β β β β β
DW 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Observations 9,475 9,475 9,475 9,475 9,475 9,475
UAj = uncertainty avoidance score of each country; LEVit = leverage; REMit = real activities-based earnings management; SGit 
= sales growth; PDj = power distance score of each country; DW = Durbin Watson; FE = fixed effect; CGit = CG score of each 
company; CGit*UAj = multiplication of the standardized values of CG and UA; CGit*PDj = multiplication of the standardized 
values of CG and PD; CGit*INDIj = multiplication of the standardized values of CG and INDI; CGit*INDUj = multiplication of 
the standardized values of CG and INDU; CGit*MASj = multiplication of the standardized values of CG and MAS; CGit*LTOj 
= multiplication of the standardized values of CG and LTO; EMit = discretionary accruals in absolute values estimated by the 
Kothari et al. (2005) model; IFRS = International Accounting Standards; INDIj = individualism score of each country; INDUj = 
indulgence score of each country; MASj = masculinity score of each country; LTOj = long-term orientation score of each country; 
ROAit-1 = return on assets; Sig. = model significance; SIZit = log of total assets; Max VIF = highest variance inflation factor (VIF) 
value; β = standardized coefficient. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors and sector and year fixed effect controls. t statistic in 
parentheses. 
***, **, * = significance at 1, 5, 10%, respectively. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Excluding the United States and Japan led to some 
changes in the results. First, the positive moderation of 
individualism in the relationship between CG and EM 
was significant at the 5% level (in Table 4 it was 10%) 
and the sum of the coefficients of CGit and CGit*INDIj 
(0.0013 : 0.0246) was positive, thus giving this evidence 
greater reliability. Second, the positive and significant 
moderation, at a 10% level, of indulgence (non-significant 
in Table 4) indicates that this cultural dimension may 
imply less effectiveness of CG in mitigating EM. Third, 
the IFRS variable, which in Table 4 was positive in five 
of the six models, was negative in all of them in this 
analysis, which reveals that the adoption of IFRS implied 
a reduction in EM. Finally, the previous evidence that 
power distance contributes to CG mechanisms reducing 
EM was confirmed (at a 10% level).
To also verify the robustness of the results of the sample 
not considering companies from the United States and 
Japan, Table 6 presents the results of the propensity score 
matching (PSM) estimation. This method carries out 
pairing according to propensity scores in order to compare 
characteristics of control and treatment groups, based on 
similarity criteria. The treatment group was composed, in 
this analysis, of companies with better CG practices (in 
which 1 represents companies with a CG score above the 
75 percentile of the sample, and 0 represents the rest) and 
the similarity criteria attributed were size, sector, and year.
Within the context of this study, the PSM seeks to 
verify whether the effectiveness of even the companies that 
show the best CG practices is impacted by the national 
culture with regards to their main objective of mitigating 
earnings management practices. 
Table 6 
Results of the influence of the dimensions of national culture on the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and 
earnings management (EM), excluding companies located in the United States and Japan, according to the propensity score 
matching (PSM)
EMit EMit EMit EMit EMit EMit
β β β β β β
Constant (9.91) (9.60) (8.61) (9.94) (8.89) (7.80)
CGit
0.0218 0.0321 0.0103 0.0084 0.0233 0.02461
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EMit EMit EMit EMit EMit EMit


























-0.1048*** -0.1066*** -0.0974*** -0.0905*** -0.0834*** -0.0873***
(-6.54) (-6.75) (-6.22) (-5.68) (-4.99) (-5.19)
ROAit-1
-0.0121 -0.0125 -0.0099 -0.0102 -0.0134 -0.0108
(-0.25) (-0.26) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.28) (-0.23)
LEVit
-0.0073 -0.0075 -0.0088 -0.0072 -0.0073 -0.0068
(-0.61) (-0.63) (-0.74) (-0.60) (-0.62) (-0.58)
SGit
0.0460* 0.0477* 0.0429* 0.0435* 0.0475* 0.0469*
(1.88) (1.95) (1.76) (1.79) (1.93) (1.91)
REMit
-0.0573*** -0.0571*** -0.0614*** -0.0568*** -0.0604 -0.0595***
(-3.63) (-3.58) (-3.86) (-3.62) (-3.81) (-3.76)
IFRSj
-0.1249*** -0.1219*** -0.1184*** -0.0982*** -0.1430*** -0.1567***
(-7.87) (-8.00) (-6.97) (-4.84) (-8.87) (-9.23)
TREAT
-0.0212 -0.0228 -0.0208 -0.0196 -0.0226 -0.0224
(-0.83) (-0.90) (-0.82) (-0.77) (-0.89) (-0.88)
Sig. 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
PSM Criterion Size, Sector, and Year
R² 5.98% 6.04% 6.08% 6.17% 6.23% 6.26%
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Max VIF 3.40 3.54 3.89 3.25 3.46 3.45
DW 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
Observations 4,738 4,738 4,738 4,738 4,738 4,738
UAj = uncertainty avoidance score of each country; LEVit = leverage; REMit = real activities-based earnings management; SGit 
= sales growth; PDj = power distance score of each country; DW = Durbin Watson; FE = fixed effect; CGit = CG score of each 
company; CGit*UAj = multiplication of the standardized values of CG and UA; CGit*PDj = multiplication of the standardized 
values of CG and PD; CGit*INDIj = multiplication of the standardized values of CG and INDI; CGit*INDUj = multiplication of 
the standardized values of CG and INDU; CGit*MASj = multiplication of the standardized values of CG and MAS; CGit*LTOj 
= multiplication of the standardized values of CG and LTO; EMit = discretionary accruals in absolute values estimated by the 
Kothari et al. (2005) model; IFRS = International Accounting Standards; INDIj = individualism score of each country; INDUj = 
indulgence score of each country; MASj = masculinity score of each country; LTOj = long-term orientation score of each country; 
ROAit-1 = return on assets; Sig. = model significance; SIZit = log of total assets; Max VIF = highest variance inflation factor (VIF) 
value; β = standardized coefficient. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors and sector and year fixed effect controls. t statistic in 
parentheses. 
***, **, * = significance at 1, 5, 10%, respectively. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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The results of the PSM confirm the findings of 
Table 5 (without the United States and Japan) regarding 
the moderating effect of individualism and indulgence 
on the relationship between CG and EM, both for the 
separate analysis of the coefficient and for the joint 
analysis (0.0321 : 0.0346; individualism/0.02461 : 0.0428; 
indulgence). With relation to the other dimensions, 
divergent results are observed for the interaction between 
power distance and CG, which was not significant in 
this analysis, and for the interaction between long-term 
orientation and CG, which was statistically related to EM.
Of the six hypotheses of this research, the results 
enable the non-rejection of H2 and H6. H2 predicted that 
the capacity of CG to mitigate EM practices would be 
reduced in countries with characteristics of individualism, 
which was revealed by the results, which even showed a 
positive and significant relationship between the topics. 
Similarly, H6 predicted that the capacity of CG to mitigate 
EM practices would be reduced in indulgent countries, 
which was empirically revealed, with the results showing 
a positive relationship between CG and EM. The non-
rejection of both hypotheses suggests that CG mechanisms 
are inefficient in mitigating EM in individualistic and 
indulgent cultural contexts.
According to Hofstede (2011), the cultural tendency for 
individualism or collectivism is a fundamental dimension 
when investigating societies and primarily differs where 
the “I” or “we” are concerned. At the individualistic 
extreme, societies are focused on privacy, on the “I” as a 
consciousness, and place more value on tasks rather than 
relationships. The cultural tendency for indulgence, in 
turn, characterizes more permissive and tolerant societies 
that support leisure activities and the idea of enjoying 
life and having fun. At the indulgent extreme, societies 
usually value the use of controls and social rules.
Valuing the “I” as a consciousness and the non-
propensity to use rules and rigid controls are empirically 
related in this research to the ineffectiveness of CG 
mechanisms, which aim to control behaviors (something 
that is avoided in indulgent societies) and align interests 
in organizations (something that is challenging in 
individualistic societies). The ineffectiveness of these 
controls is what results in the greater EM in individualistic 
and indulgent contexts.
With relation to the other dimensions of national 
culture, indications can be observed that power distance 
may be an aspect that boosts the negative relationship 
between CG and EM (Tables 4 and 5), as well as the long-
term orientation dimension (Table 6). However, we chose 
not to confirm the hypotheses regarding the moderating 
role of these dimensions, given that these relationships 
were not robustly proven; that is, both in the analysis 
without the most populous countries (Table 5) and in the 
analysis using the PSM method (Table 6). Future studies 
could delve deeper into that analysis.
In general, the results revealed contribute to the 
literature by showing that the cultural tendencies of 
individualism and indulgence influence the relationship 
between CG and EM, which suggests that future studies 
should consider these cultural aspects in their analyses. 
Moreover, this research contributes by analyzing the 
relationship between CG and EM using the cultural 
influence approach, a theoretical lens that predicts the 
influence of culture in social sciences. 
This research also contributes to the CG theme 
by using a comprehensive measure as a proxy. This is 
important, as there are different agency problems, such as 
between managers and shareholders or between minority 
and majority shareholders. All these mechanisms are 
covered using the CG pillar; for this reason, even if 
in a particular context the agents and principals are 
different, the metric employed can capture the different 
mechanisms used to monitor each type of agency 
relationship.
In practical terms, these results contribute to 
organizations exposed to individualistic and indulgent 
cultures by revealing that in these contexts CG mechanisms 
are likely to be ineffective in minimizing EM, which suggests 
the organizations should seek solutions and improve their 
control processes. For investors and shareholders, these 
findings may be useful in terms of alerting them to the 
need for greater caution when analyzing these cultural 
contexts in which CG mechanisms tend to be less effective 
in achieving their objectives. Shareholders could require 
the inclusion of more sophisticated CG mechanisms or 
control the ability of these to align interests and monitor 
behaviors, given that the cultural tendency instigates 
ineffectiveness in them.
6. CONCLUSION
It is concluded that the dimensions of national 
culture can help explain previous results that have 
revealed the ineffectiveness of CG mechanisms in 
mitigating opportunistic EM practices. The cultural 
tendencies of countries, more specifically individualism 
and indulgence, can instigate a positive relationship 
between CG mechanisms and EM practices, which 
means that in such contexts CG mechanisms do not 
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achieve their objectives of aligning interests and 
monitoring behaviors to minimize the opportunistic 
behavior of managers.
It is worth highlighting, however, that the influence 
of national culture on the relationship between CG and 
EM is a topic that is still in its infancy, given that the 
present research uses analogies to previous concepts and 
assumes a number of relationships, only two of which 
were robustly confirmed. For that reason, we suggest new 
investigations into the topic, which could consider other 
national culture models and other proxies for accounting 
information quality.
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